关于深化高等学校人事制度改革的实施意见
中共中央组织部 人事部 教 育 部
关于印发《关于深化高等学校人事制度改革的实施意见》的通知
人发［２０００］59号
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中共中央组织部 人事部 教 育 部
二○○○年六月二日
关于深化高等学校人事制度改革的实施意见
随着我国高等教育管理体制、办学体制、内部管理体制改革的不断深入，各地在高等学校人事管理体制和运行机制改革方面进行了许多有益的探索，取得了一些经验。为了适应我国高等教育改革和发展的要求，迫切需要进一步加快高等学校人事和分配制度改革的步伐，建立起适应社会主义市场经济体制和符合高等教育发展规律的高等学校人事管理制度。
一、深化高等学校人事制度改革的指导思想和目标
1、深化高等学校人事制度改革的指导思想是，以邓小平理论和党的十五大精神为指导，认真贯彻实施科教兴国的战略方针，实施《教师法》、《高等教育法》和党中央、国务院关于深化教育改革的一系列重大决策，以合理配置教育人才资源、优化高等学校人员结构、全面提高教育质量和办学效益为核心，理顺人事管理体制，引入竞争激励机制，加强机构编制管理，进一步改革用人和分配制度，为高等学校的改革与发展提供强有力的组织保证和人才支持。
2、深化高等学校人事制度改革的目标是，通过规范政府及其职能部门、高等学校主管部门与高等学校的职责权限，理顺政事关系，下放管理权限，落实高等学校办学自主权，为高等学校的改革和发展创造良好的社会环境；逐步建立符合高等学校特点的学校自主用人、人员自主择业、政府依法监督、配套措施完善的人事管理新体制；进一步健全高等学校内部的竞争机制和激励机制，转换人事管理的运行机制，搞活用人制度和分配制度。
二、积极推进高等学校机构编制改革，规范高等学校内部组织结构
3、按照“总量控制、微观放权、规范合理、精减高效”的原则进行高等学校机构编制改革。理顺编制管理体制，实行国家制定编制法规和实施宏观控制、高等学校主管部门贯彻编制法规和进行检查评估、高等学校遵守编制法规和有效实施编制管理的管理办法。
教育部会同有关部门抓紧研究制定高等学校机构编制管理办法。
4、根据高等学校教学、科研、校办产业、后勤服务各方面的不同职能，实行不同的管理办法。教学、科研是高等学校的主要任务，要进一步改革和完善教学、科研工作的管理体制，探索和建立符合教学、科研规律的组织形式；后勤服务要从学校中剥离出来，抓住有利时机，创造条件，实现社会化。校办产业要与学校建立规范的关系，明确学校与校办产业之间的职责与权益，校办产业要按照独立法人实体进行企业化管理，逐步建立现代企业制度。
5、根据《高等教育法》和《中国共产党普通高等学校基层组织工作条例》所确定的高等学校的工作任务和精干、高效的原则，合理设置学校党政职能部门。高等学校的内设机构不要求上下对口。合并主体职能相近的部门，对任务性质基本相同的机构可实行合署办公。要根据高等学校教学、科研的发展需要和党的建设工作的要求，在上级主管部门核定的编制总数内合理确定人员结构比例并配置各类人员，优化高等学校的教职工队伍，努力提高生员比和生师比，大幅度提高教师占教职工的比例。
三、坚持党管干部原则，改进高等学校领导人员管理办法
6、高等学校实行党委领导下的校长负责制，要把坚持党管干部原则同充分尊重支持校长依法行使用人权有机地结合起来。要选拔那些政治坚定、师德高尚、学术水平较高、具有较强领导能力和管理水平的同志担任高等学校的领导职务，特别要注重选配好党委书记和校长。
高等学校党委要在不断加强自身建设的同时，切实抓好院（系）领导班子建设，加强对校内各级各类领导干部的管理和监督。适应新形势下高等学校工作的新情况、新特点，全面加强学校中党的建设工作和思想政治工作，切实维护团结稳定的大局。继续大力加强教师队伍建设，特别是加强师德、师风建设，努力建设一支适应全面贯彻党的教育方针、适应新世纪要求的高素质的教师队伍。
7、引入竞争机制，坚持走群众路线，继续深化高等学校领导干部选拔、任用制度改革。对不同类型的学校和不同领导职务，分别实行聘任、选任、委任、考任等多种任用形式。努力扩大选人视野，大力拓宽选人渠道，按照公开、平等、竞争、择优的原则，尽可能地在较大范围内选拔担任学校领导职务的合适人选。
8、探索实行高等学校领导班子和领导人员任期制。要明确任期目标，加强届中、届满时对完成任期目标情况的考核，并把考核结果作为对领导人员奖惩和任用的重要依据。
四、全面推行聘用制，建立符合高等学校办学规律、充满生机与活力的用人制度
9、进一步强化竞争机制，改革固定用人制度，破除职务终身制和人才单位所有制，按照“按需设岗、公开招聘、平等竞争、择优聘用、严格考核、合同管理”的原则，在高等学校工作人员中全面推行聘用（聘任）制度。学校根据学科建设和教学、科研任务的需要，科学合理地设置教学、科研、管理等各级各类岗位，明确岗位职责、任职条件、权利义务和聘任期限，按照规定程序对各级各类岗位实行公开招聘，平等竞争、择优聘用。学校和教职工在平等自愿的基础上，通过签订聘用（聘任）合同，确立受法律保护的人事关系。
10、高等学校的教师和其他专业技术人员实行职务聘任制。把教师职务聘任制和教师资格制度结合起来，坚持从具有教师资格的人员中聘用教师。专业技术职务聘任工作要理顺评审与聘任的关系，淡化“身份”评审，强化岗位聘任。
11、高等学校的管理人员实行教育职员制度。教育职员实行聘任制。教育职员制度先在部分高等学校进行试点，在取得经验、完善办法后逐步推开。
12、探索建立教学、科研、管理关键岗位制度。积极吸引和遴选国内外优秀学术带头人和优秀管理人才到高等学校任教、工作，在学校努力形成优秀拔尖人才脱颖而出的机制。
13、按照相对稳定、合理流动、专兼结合、资源共享的原则，探索建立相对稳定的骨干人员和出入有序的流动人员相结合、以教师为主的高等学校人才资源开发机制。鼓励校际之间互聘、联聘教师。通过聘任社会兼职教师、实行在学研究生的助教、助研、助管的“三助”制度等多种途径，促进高等学校教师与社会人才资源的优化配置，提高办学效益。
14、进一步健全考核制度，加强聘后管理。结合年度考核工作，采取适当形式，对聘用（聘任）人员应履行的职责任务进行考核。经考核不能胜任本职工作的，或聘方所提供的条件发生重大变化时，可以通过解聘、辞聘等形式，解除聘用合同，终止聘用关系。同时，被聘人员也有权要求学校按照聘用(聘任)合同的规定提供教学、科研等工作条件。
15、根据国家有关人事争议处理的有关政策，积极稳妥地处理有关人事争议，依法保障教职工和学校双方的合法权益。教职工对学校作出的涉及本人权益的人事处理决定不服，可向人事争议调解组织申请调解；调解未果的，可向人事争议仲裁机构申请仲裁。
五、加大分配制度改革的力度，健全高等学校的分配激励机制
16、积极推进高等学校分配制度改革。在国家政策指导下，进一步加大搞活学校内部分配的力度，扩大学校分配自主权，建立重实绩、重贡献、向高层次人才和重点岗位倾斜的分配激励机制。高等学校主管部门根据国家工资管理的有关规定，通过实行工资总额动态包干管理等办法，搞活高等学校内部分配。
17、高等学校要积极探索适合本单位特点的多种分配形式和办法。在国家政策指导下，根据“效率优先，兼顾公平”、“生产要素参与分配”的原则，探索建立以岗定薪、按劳取酬、优劳优酬、以岗位工资为主要内容的校内分配办法。要将教职工的工资收入与岗位职责、工作业绩、实际贡献以及知识、技术、成果转化中产生的社会效益和经济效益等直接挂钩，向优秀人才和关键岗位倾斜，充分发挥工资的激励功能。
18、认真落实《促进科技成果转化的若干规定》和国家有关科技成果转化奖励和优惠的政策，加强产学研相结合，兑现高等学校科技人员成果转化的奖励，允许和鼓励高等学校专业技术人员通过转化科技成果、促进科技进步先富起来。
19、进一步发挥工资的导向作用，实行向优秀人才和关键岗位倾斜的政策，经国家有关部门批准，高等学校可根据教学、科研和管理工作的实际需要，高薪聘用优秀拔尖人才，努力实现一流人才、一流业绩、一流报酬。
六、妥善安置未聘人员，形成人才合理流动的机制
20、按照“新人新办法”的原则，对本实施意见实行后新聘用（聘任）的教职工，严格按照聘用（聘任）合同管理的规定，在聘期内双方履行规定的权利和义务，聘期满后双方可根据自愿的原则续聘或不再续聘。
按照“老人老办法”的原则，对本实施意见实行前原学校教职工中的落聘、待聘人员，采取校内转岗聘任等办法，以及鼓励高等学校教师到其他大学、高职、专科学校或中小学任教，形成合理的梯次流动。对少数因身体原因等不适合继续工作的教职工，可按照国家有关文件规定办理退休手续。
21、有条件的高等学校可设立校内人才交流中心，主要承担本校教师及专业人员的人才交流工作。待聘、落聘等富余人员可通过高等学校人才交流中心与所在地政府人才交流机构形成的网络，在学校之间、地区之间进行流动，也可由所在地政府人事部门所属的人才交流机构实行人事代理。
采取优惠政策鼓励经济发达地区或城市的大学教职工到边远地区大中小学任教。政府人事部门所属的人才交流机构应积极为高等学校人才的流动提供服务。各校要开展多种形式的培训，为富余人员再就业提供学习、培训机会。
七、切实加强对高等学校人事制度改革的领导
22、高等学校人事制度改革是我国整个干部人事制度改革的一个重要组成部分。各级党委和政府要高度重视，加强领导。近年来已进行高校内部管理体制改革或人事分配制度改革的地区和部门，要认真按照本实施意见进一步深化高等学校人事制度改革；尚未开展改革的地区和部门，要根据本实施意见立即开展各项改革。在推进改革的过程中，要坚持从实际出发，加强分类指导，及时研究解决改革中出现的各种新情况新问题，积极稳妥地推进高等学校人事制度改革。
23、在高等学校人事制度改革过程中，要认真贯彻《教育法》和《高等教育法》，进一步落实高等学校办学自主权。学校作为具有独立法人资格的事业单位主体，依法自主、有效地管理学校内部事务，承担相应的义务和责任。各级政府及其职能部门，都不得干预学校自主办学权范围内的事务。各级党委和组织、人事部门，要加强对高等学校人事制度改革工作的宏观管理和指导协调，教育行政部门或高等学校主管部门要发挥职能作用，结合实际，研究制定实施意见，统筹规划改革进程，认真组织实施工作。
24、各高等学校要在深入调查研究和科学论证的基础上，研究制定切实可行的具体方案，精心组织，周密部署，积极稳妥地推进本校的改革工作。学校党委书记、校长要亲自挂帅，成立专门领导小组，积极推进改革。改革的一些重大措施，要在充分酝酿的基础上，由学校党政领导班子集体讨论决策，注意通过教职工代表大会等多种途径广泛征求教职工的意见。要发挥党组织的政治优势，正确把握改革方向，有针对性地开展思想政治工作，引导广大教职工积极支持和参与改革，认真处理好高等学校改革、发展和稳定的关系，确保各项人事制度改革收到实效，以促进我国高等教育改革与发展各项工作的顺利进行。
主题词： 人事 教育 学校 改革 通知
抄送：副省级城市党委组织部，人民政府人事局、教育局
Chapter VIII
Strengthening of the Multilateral System
Art. 23 of the DSU deals, as indicated by its title, with the “Strengthening of the Multilateral System”. Its overall design is to prevent WTO Members from unilaterally resolving their disputes in respect of WTO rights and obligations. It does so by obligating Members to follow the multilateral rules and procedures of the DSU. Art. 23 of the DSU reads:
“Strengthening of the Multilateral System
1. When Members seek the redress of a violation of obligations or other nullification or impairment of benefits under the covered agreements or an impediment to the attainment of any objective of the covered agreements, they shall have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of this Understanding.
2. In such cases, Members shall:
(a) not make a determination to the effect that a violation has occurred, that benefits have been nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the covered agreements has been impeded, except through recourse to dispute settlement in accordance with the rules and procedures of this Understanding, and shall make any such determination consistent with the findings contained in the panel or Appellate Body report adopted by the DSB or an arbitration award rendered under this Understanding;
(b) follow the procedures set forth in Article 21 to determine the reasonable period of time for the Member concerned to implement the recommendations and rulings; and
(c) follow the procedures set forth in Article 22 to determine the level of suspension of concessions or other obligations and obtain DSB authorization in accordance with those procedures before suspending concessions or other obligations under the covered agreements in response to the failure of the Member concerned to implement the recommendations and rulings within that reasonable period of time.”
In this section, to end this book, the author means to take a precise overlook on the nature of obligations under Art. 23 of the DSU as a whole by referring to two panels’ reports in part. In this respect, the Panel in US-Sections 301-310 (DS152) rules: 1
“On this basis [provision of Article 23], we conclude as follows:
(a)It is for the WTO through the DSU process - not for an individual WTO Member - to determine that a WTO inconsistency has occurred (Article 23.2(a)).
(b)It is for the WTO or both of the disputing parties, through the procedures set forth in Article 21 - not for an individual WTO Member - to determine the reasonable period of time for the Member concerned to implement DSB recommendations and rulings (Article 23.2(b)).
(c)It is for the WTO through the procedures set forth in Article 22 - not for an individual WTO Member - to determine, in the event of disagreement, the level of suspension of concessions or other obligations that can be imposed as a result of a WTO inconsistency, as well as to grant authorization for the actual implementation of these suspensions.
Article 23.2 clearly, thus, prohibits specific instances of unilateral conduct by WTO Members when they seek redress for WTO inconsistencies in any given dispute. This is, in our view, the first type of obligations covered under Article 23.
Article 23.1 is not concerned only with specific instances of violation. It prescribes a general duty of a dual nature. First, it imposes on all Members to ‘have recourse to’ the multilateral process set out in the DSU when they seek the redress of a WTO inconsistency. In these circumstances, Members have to have recourse to the DSU dispute settlement system to the exclusion of any other system, in particular a system of unilateral enforcement of WTO rights and obligations. This, what one could call ‘exclusive dispute resolution clause’, is an important new element of Members' rights and obligations under the DSU. Second, Article 23.1 also prescribes that Members, when they have recourse to the dispute settlement system in the DSU, have to ‘abide by’ the rules and procedures set out in the DSU. This second obligation under Article 23.1 is of a confirmatory nature: when having recourse to the DSU Members must abide by all DSU rules and procedures.
Turning to the second paragraph under Article 23, Article 23.2 - which, on its face, addresses conduct in specific disputes - starts with the words ‘[i]n such cases’. It is, thus, explicitly linked to, and has to be read together with and subject to, Article 23.1.
Indeed, two of the three prohibitions mentioned in Article 23.2 - Article 23.2(b) and (c) - are but egregious examples of conduct that contradicts the rules and procedures of the DSU which, under the obligation in Article 23.1 to ‘abide by the rules and procedures’ of the DSU, Members are obligated to follow. These rules and procedures clearly cover much more than the ones specifically mentioned in Article 23.2. There is a great deal more State conduct which can violate the general obligation in Article 23.1 to have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of the DSU than the instances especially singled out in Article 23.2.
Article 23 interdicts, thus, more than action in specific disputes, it also provides discipline for the general process WTO Members must follow when seeking redress of WTO inconsistencies. A violation of the explicit provisions of Article 23 can, therefore, be of two different kinds. It can be caused
(a)by an ad hoc, specific action in a given dispute, or
(b)by measures of general applicability, e.g. legislation or regulations, providing for a certain process to be followed which does not, say, include recourse to the DSU dispute settlement system or abide by the rules and procedures of the DSU.”
Furthermore, as to Art. 23 of the DSU, the Panel in US-Import Measures (DS165) confirms the ruling developed in US-Sections 301-310, and states: 2
“The Panel believes that the adopted Panel Report on United States - Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974 (‘US - Section 301’) has confirmed the crucial importance that WTO Members place on the dispute settlement system of the WTO, as the exclusive means to redress any violations of any provisions of the WTO Agreement. This fundamental principle is embedded in Article 23 of the DSU: …
An important reason why Article 23 of the DSU must be interpreted with a view to prohibiting any form of unilateral action is because such unilateral actions threaten the stability and predictability of the multilateral trade system, a necessary component for "market conditions conducive to individual economic activity in national and global markets" which, in themselves, constitute a fundamental goal of the WTO. Unilateral actions are, therefore, contrary to the essence of the multilateral trade system of the WTO. As stated in the Panel Report on US - Section 301:
‘7.75 Providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system is another central object and purpose of the system which could be instrumental to achieving the broad objectives of the Preamble. Of all WTO disciplines, the DSU is one of the most important instruments to protect the security and predictability of the multilateral trading system and through it that of the market-place and its different operators. DSU provisions must, thus, be interpreted in the light of this object and purpose and in a manner which would most effectively enhance it.’
The structure of Article 23 is that the first paragraph states the general prohibition or general obligation, i.e. when Members seek the redress of a WTO violation, they shall do so only through the DSU. This is a general obligation. Any attempt to seek ‘redress’ can take place only in the institutional framework of the WTO and pursuant to the rules and procedures of the DSU.
The prohibition against unilateral redress in the WTO sectors is more directly provided for in the second paragraph of Article 23. From the ordinary meaning of the terms used in the chapeau of Article 23.2 (‘in such cases, Members shall’), it is also clear that the second paragraph of Article 23 is ‘explicitly linked to, and has to be read together with and subject to, Article 23.1’. That is to say, the specific prohibitions of paragraph 2 of Article 23 have to be understood in the context of the first paragraph, i.e. when such action is performed by a WTO Member with a view to redressing a WTO violation.
We also agree with the US - Section 301 Panel Report that Article 23.2 contains ‘egregious examples of conduct that contradict the rules of the DSU’ and which constitute more specific forms of unilateral actions, otherwise generally prohibited by Article 23.1 of the DSU.
‘[t]hese rules and procedures [Article 23.1] clearly cover much more than the ones specifically mentioned in Article 23.2. There is a great deal more State conduct which can violate the general obligation in Article 23.1 to have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of the DSU than the instances especially singled out in Article 23.2.’
The same Panel identified a few examples of such instances where the DSU could be violated contrary to the provisions of Article 23. Each time a Member seeking the redress of a WTO violation is not abiding by a rule of the DSU, it thus violates Article 23.1 of the DSU.
In order to verify whether individual provisions of Article 23.2 have been infringed (keeping in mind that the obligation to also observe other DSU provisions can be brought under the umbrella of Article 23.1), we must first determine whether the measure at issue comes under the coverage of Article 23.1. In other words, we need to determine whether Article 23 is applicable to the dispute before addressing the specific violations envisaged in the second paragraph of Article 23 of the DSU or elsewhere in the DSU.
Article 23.1 of the DSU provides that the criterion for determining whether Article 23 is applicable is whether the Member that imposed the measure was ‘seeking the redress of’ a WTO violation. …
The term ‘seeking’ or ‘to seek’ is defined in the Webster New Encyclopedic Dictionary as: ‘to resort to, … to make an attempt, try’. This term would therefore cover situations where an effort is made to redress WTO violations (whether perceived or WTO determined violations). The term ‘to redress’ is defined in the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary as ‘repair (an action); atone for (a misdeed); remedy or remove; to set right or rectify (injury, a wrong, a grievance etc.); obtaining reparation or compensation’. The term ‘redress’ is defined in the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary as: ‘reparation of or compensation for a wrong or consequent loss; remedy for or relief from some trouble; correction or reformation of something wrong’. The term 'redress' implies, therefore, a reaction by a Member against another Member, because of a perceived (or WTO determined) WTO violation, with a view to remedying the situation.
Article 23.1 of the DSU prescribes that when a WTO Member wants to take any remedial action in response to what it views as a WTO violation, it is obligated to have recourse to and abide by the DSU rules and procedures. In case of a grievance on a WTO matter, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism is the only means available to WTO Members to obtain relief, and only the remedial actions envisaged in the WTO system can be used by WTO Members. The remedial actions relate to restoring the balance of rights and obligations which form the basis of the WTO Agreement, and include the removal of the inconsistent measure, the possibility of (temporary) compensation and, in last resort, the (temporary) suspension of concessions or other obligations authorised by the DSB (Articles 3.7 and 22.1 of the DSU). The latter remedy is essentially retaliatory in nature.”
【NOTE】:
1. See, in detail, WT/DS152/R/7.38-7.46.
2. See, in detail, WT/DS165/R/6.13-6.23.
List of References
1 Sources of Legal Texts: http://www.wto.org; WTO Secretariat: The WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures (Second Edition), CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2001.
